#### Why would you ever want to use becoming-woman? Deleuze grossly calls woman “sexuality itself” and orients the woman as a simulacrum to be appropriated for the becoming-man and eliminates female subjectivity–turns case

Jardine 84 (Alice Jardine, “Woman in Limbo: Deleuze and His Br(others)”, SubStance, Vol. 13, No. ¾, Issue 44-45, University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3684774>, P 52-54, //Accessed 9/10/16 GK)

With D + G, however, none of these reasonings about becoming woman hold sway. There are, of course, overlappings (as, for example, with "There is a becoming-woman in writing" [DLS, p. 55]), but they are few. For here, what is involved is le devenir femme de tout le monde, the becoming woman of every one everything, the whole world. With D + G, "to become woman" is less a metaphor for describing a certain social or textual process than a true meta morphosis-one thinks of Kafka's Gregor Samsa waking up as a bug. This is mainly because D + G's imperative "to become woman" has very little to do with women, at least not with women as D + G perceive them, **as caught up within a Western binary machine over which they cannot and will never have control.** In order not to lose sight of how and why this is so, it is essential to remember that the devenir, "becoming," for D + G, is a process, one which cannot be described or put into motion by any of our current conceptual machinery: "To become is never to imitate, nor to conform oneself to a model, whether it be of justice or of truth. There is no term from which one departs, nor one to which one arrives or should arrive. Nor are there two terms which are inter changeable. The question 'what's become of you?' is particularly stupid. Because as someone becomes, what he becomes changes as much as he does" (DLS, p. 8). With "becoming" there is no past or future and certainly no present there is no linear history: "In becoming, it is more a matter of involuting: this is neither regressing nor progressing" (DLS, p. 37). "Becoming" is topological, geological, geographical, not historical [DLS, p. 48]. "Becoming," for D + G, means becoming caught up in a process of osmosis (not metaphor) with de-anthropologized and de-identitized entities - women, infants, animals, foreigners, the insane - in order to resist the dominant mode of representation represented by any majority. "People are always thinking of a majority future (when I'm grown up, when I'm in power . . ). When really the problem is one of a becoming-minority: not to act like, not to do like or imitate the infant, fool, woman, animal, stutterer, or foreigner, but to become all that, in order to invent new forces or new weapons" (DLS, p. 11). This osmosis maintains no identities, no images. To be caught up in a "becoming animal" means that one will resemble neither Man nor the Animal, but, rather, that each will "deterritorialize" the other. The final stage of"becoming" is to become "imperceptible" - beyond any percipion as historically required for Man to master the world - or woman. This does not mean, however, that all of these becomings are in a relationship of equality one to the other. The need for one or the other, in fact, changes according to the binary machine one is "escaping" from, and, in all cases, the "becoming woman" always has, over all the others, what D + G call a "particular introductory power" (MP, p. 304), a status as "first quantum" (MP, p. 342). "However, if all becomings are already molecular [as opposed to molar], including the becoming-woman, it should also be said that all becomings begin and pass through the becoming-woman. It's the key to the other becomings" (MP, p. 340). Again, this is not to say that "becoming woman" has anything to do with women per se. D + G's becoming woman is one "which is not [to be] confused with women, their past or future, and it is necessary that women enter into this becoming in order to exit from their past, their future, their history" (DLS, p. 8). We are not talking about men and women here, because they can only exist in the Western binary machine. It is, rather, a question "not [of] man and [of] woman taken as sexual entities, held in a binary apparatus, but [of] a molecular becoming, the birth of a molecular woman in music, the birth of a molecular sonority in a woman" (DLS, p. 122). Why then do D + G privilege the word woman? First, as they explain **through a series of unanalyzed stereotypes, because it is "sexuality itself"** which is the ultimate, uncontrollable becoming, when it can manage to escape immediate Oedipalization. ("Sexuality passes through the becoming-woman of[the] man and the becoming-animal of the human" [MP, p. 341].) But also because, as "introductory power," "Woman" is both the closest to the category of "Man" as majority, and yet she remains a distinct minority. D + G explain that the notions of majority and minority here should not be opposed in any purely quantitative way: "Let us suppose that the constant or standard is Man- any white-male-adult-city-dweller-speaking a standard language-European-heterosexual (the Ulysses of Joyce or of Ezra Pound). It is obvious that "the Man" has the majority, even if he is less numerous than the mosquitoes, children, Blacks, peasants, homosexuals . . . etc." (MP, p. 133). The problem is not to gain, or accede to, the majority, but to become a minority; and this is particularly crucial for women if they desire to remain radical, creative, without simply becoming (a) Man: The only becoming is a minority one. Women, regardless of their number, are a minority, definable as a state or sub-set; but they only create by rendering possible a becoming, of which they do not have the ownership, into which they themselves must enter, a becoming-woman which concerns all of mankind, men and women included. (MP, p. 134) The woman who does not enter into the "becoming woman" remains a Man, remains "molar," just like men: Woman as a molar entity must become woman, so that man as well may become one or is then able to become one. It is certainly indispensable that women engage in molar politics, in terms of a conquest which they conduct from their organization, from their own history, from their own subjectivity: "We as women . ." then appears as the subject of the enunciation. **But it is dangerous to fall back upon such a subject, which cannot function without drying up a spring or stopping a flood.** The Song of life is often struck up by the driest women, animated by resentment, by the desire for power and by cold mothering. .. . (MP, p. 339) That is, woman (with her obligatory connotations: "transparent force, innocence, speed," [MP, p. 354] is what Man (both men and women: “virility, gravity," [MP, p. 354]) must become. There must be no "becoming man" because he is always already a majority. "In a certain way, **it's always 'man' who is the subject of a becoming**. . .. **A woman has to become woman, but in a becoming-woman of all of mankind"** (MP, p. 357). That is, Man is always the subject of any becoming, even if "he" is a woman. A woman who is not a "woman-become" is a Man - and a subject to that extent and to that extent only. Woman is never a subject but a limit - a border of and for Man - the "becoming woman" is l'avenir de l'homme tout entier- the future of all Mankind. For D + G, She is what the entire world must become if Man men and women - is truly to disappear. But to the extent that women must "become woman" first (in order for men, in D + G's words, to "follow her example"), might that not mean that she must also be the first to disappear? Is it not possible that the process of "becoming woman" is but a new variation of an old allegory for the process of women becoming obsolete? **There would remain only her simulacrum: a female figure caught in a whirling sea of male configurations**. A silent, mutable, head-less, desire-less, spatial surface necessary only for His metamorphosis? Physicists say: Holes are not the absence of particles, but particles going faster than light. Flying anuses, rapid vaginas, there is no castration.Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Mille Plateaux. Most important theorists have a repertory of exemplary fictions, fictions that they call upon frequently to interact with their specific theories in creative if predictable ways. Between the scene of Lacanian psychoanalysis and that of Lol V. Stein's ravishing, for example, the privileged rapport is one of repetition: for Lacan, Marguerite Duras understood and repeated his teachings without him.19 Or, between the invagination of Derrida's e'criture and that of the narrator in Maurice Blanchot's L'Arrit de mort, what is privileged is the process of mime: for Derrida, Blanchot understood his writings with him, inseparably.20 D + G's exemplary fiction writers include Lewis Carroll, Franz Kafka, Pierre Klossowski, and Michel Tournier--to mention only a few. What all of these writers' texts share with those of D + G is the surface quality of their figures: the privileged modality of relationship between the configurations of Deleuzian becoming and those of fiction is allegory. This is made most clear through Deleuze's essay on Tournier's 1967 novel, Vendredi, ou les limbes du Pacifique. 21 There it is no longer a question of whether Duras's Lol, as hysterical body, is or is not a subject of narrative; of whether Blanchot's J. and N., as organs of a hysterical text, are or are not simply new angles for modernity. For here it is a question of Speranza, a true Body-without-Organs: a woman who is not a woman but a female figure (an island), a space to be unfolded, molded, into new configurations for the metamorphosis of Man.

#### Becoming woman can never escape the gendered rhetoric that creates the patriarchal exclusion. The aff is rooted in the androcentric project and cant overcome the exclusion of the female body in their female body and ultimately has an end that is gendered or it fosters a subjectivity in which the female body cant survive

Shukin 2k NICOLE SHUKIN Becoming-Woman Now VERENA ANDERMATT CONLEY 2000 Full book “Deleuze and Feminism” Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook: Colebrook is a professor of English at University of Pennsylvania. Ian Buchanan is the Director of the Institute for Social Transformation Research based at University of Wollongong.EBSCO Host DOA 10/7/16 KAE-GK

Deleuze’s ‘pragmatism’, his preference for becomings generated on surfaces, leads him to favour sites of extreme potency, or, in machinic parlance, motor power. His affirmation of creative force is reflected in a culinary fetish: of food that secretes power and prowess, metonyms for the ‘liberated elements’ in what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘the body without organs’ (1987: 260). Deleuze’s favourite things, furthermore, connote a virility of force and a blood-lust for becomings that are peculiarly male gendered. Unverifiably, but arguably, brain, tongue and marrow emit a muscular and raw masculinity. Considering Deleuze’s philosophical renovation of the self as an assemblage that scatters and reconvenes, a composition ever on the move, it is indeed hard to imagine him nurturing a taste for duck or fish, for meals consisting of whole organisms. Indirectly linked with the richness of his favourite foods is an emphasis on intensity as a valid ontology and the belief that molecular units of potency, or ‘kinematic entities’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 255), are capable of disrupting systems of control and capture, state and family apparatuses. This aspect of the thinking of Deleuze verges upon a romanticisation of the involuntary that threatens to exclude embodied women. One can trace the notion of the involuntary to Proust and Signs, where Deleuze links it to what he calls ‘the virtual’: ‘Proust asks the question: how shall we save the past as it is in itself? It is to this question that involuntary Memory offers its answer . . . This ideal reality, this virtuality, is essence, which is realized or incarnated in involuntary memory’ (Deleuze 1972: 60). In A Thousand Plateaus, to my mind, the involuntary turns into a relatively submerged quality associated with everything that resists regulatory apparatuses. Yet it is not at the site of the involuntary so much as at its unexpected conciliation with the regulatory implied by his virile tastes that feminisms need to be on the alert. Deleuze’s investment in the involuntary contains ethnographic overtones that are significant to a critical feminist reading. From what can be gleaned from his interviews with Parnet, Deleuze distinctly favours the raw over the cooked. Deleuze disagreed strongly with the structural anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss and his ‘institution of the totem’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 237). Yet the text of A Thousand Plateaus continuously invokes phenomena that evade domestication – or cooking – by Western culture: ‘nomad thought’, ‘primitive societies’, ‘the East’, war machines, music, packs, swarms, tribes, anomalies, becoming-woman, becoming-child, becoming-animal, -vegetable, -mineral, -molecular, sadomasochism, drugs, and so on. For this reason it is not amiss to resort to the very interpretations that Deleuze took issue with to explore a contrast Deleuze and Guattari stage between ‘nonvoluntary transmutation’ and domestication (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 269). It is because Levi-Strauss reduced different myths to the single structural paradigm, of the raw and the cooked, that Deleuze dis- agreed with his methodology, just as he disagreed with Freud’s absorption of a multiplicity of experiences into the Oedipal triangle. As Levi-Strauss writes: I propose to show that M1 (the key myth) belongs to a set of myths that explain the origin of the cooking of food . . . that cooking is con- ceived of in native thought as a form of mediation; and finally, that this particular aspect remains concealed in the Bororo myth, because the latter is in fact an inversion, or a reversal, of myths originating in neighbouring communities which view culinary operations as media- tory activities between heaven and earth, life and death, nature and society. (Levi Strauss 1969: 64–5) Fire and cooking, Levi-Strauss continues, are ‘the origin of man’s mortality’ (164); cooking instigates not just the nature/culture divide, but also the loss of an innate or immanent power of immor- tality retained by raw food. Also of importance to my purposes here is the connection Levi-Strauss finds in the myths between women and food: ‘[I]t is worthy of note that in the myths just discussed the sexual code should be apparent only in its masculine references . . . When the references are feminine, the sexual code becomes latent and is concealed beneath the alimentary code’ (269). It is my contention that the thinking of Deleuze contains a mythological or affective component that can be read according to the interpretations of Levi-Strauss. Deleuze seeks a power of immanence and ‘the movement of the infinite’ in becomings and machinic assemblages which are largely cast as involuntary (281). A broad division is set up in A Thousand Plateaus between an intense ‘nomadology’ (the raw) and domestic, regulatory structures (the cooked), a distinction that is unexpectedly reminiscent of nature/ culture binaries. Finally, Deleuze and Guattari never address the overdetermined historical, mythological, or affective associations between the female gender and domesticity, between women and cooked food. For this reason, gender remains to a great extent latent in A Thousand Plateaus.

#### Vote neg as an act of aborting the 1AC and pass the aff through the revolting corporeal threshold. This abjection is a method of embracing difference and diving into the unknown prism of our consciousness of the female body

Bono 05 (Paola Bono, “The Abjection of the Female Body: Hell as a Metaphor for Birth,” 2005, http://arts. monash.edu.au/cclcs/research/papers/ //Accessed 10/14/16 GK)

A new-born baby, really just born, the umbilical cord not yet cut; naked and crying, its face screwed up in the effort. Still dirty with blood and mucus, marks of its passage through the physical, corporeal threshold it has crossed to come to life. Carnal threshold, vagina of the mother's body, whence it comes, in whose womb it has grown - living matter on its way to being; so that the traces of that body still show on its little body. Some of you might remember this image: one of Benetton's "scandalous" ads, which some years ago did in fact provoke scandalized reactions, at least in Italy. Because it was being used for commercial ends, because it exploited childhood - nay, babyhood, for mercenary purposes. Or so the argument went. While childhood and exploitation would seem to have nothing to do with those babies who appear in numberless ads for diapers and baby-food; there has never been such an outcry in those cases. But then those babies are so pretty, so smiling and, most important, so clean! A further criticism (perhaps not spelled out exactly in these terms, but certainly this was its meaning) maintained that the ad violated - again, for those reproachable commercial ends - a most important and sacred moment, the moment of birth. And here I think is a crucial point, a truth at the core of those scandalized reactions: in the concept of the sacred, and in the focus on birth.       The reasons given for it may strike one as hypocritical, but the spontaneous recoiling in disgust was sincere. What that image signified was birth in its "improper" physical reality, showing its traces on the baby's body dirty of the con/fusion with the mother's body. Mucus, blood, the wet stickiness of the carnal threshold, con/fusion: elements which, in Kristeva's term, we could recognize as belonging to the category of the abject. Because they are secretions, because they are inscribed in a borderline area: between the outside and the inside of the body, between the undefined self and other of the pre-natal dyad. It was an indecent image which exposed a secret everybody knows, the secret of an event everybody has experienced. It was unheimlich, uncanny in its familiarity and in its bringing to conscious attention what was and should have remained buried in the unconscious.       Building upon Freud's notion of the uncanny as taboo, and referring to anthropological research, especially Mary Douglas' on purity and contamination, Kristeva in *Powers of* Horror identifies abjection - "one of those violent, dark revolts of being" (Kristeva 1982: 1) - as the horror of not knowing the borders of the self, a primary uncanny originated in the fertility and generative power of the mother's body. Like abjection, pregnancy and the pre-natal period are borderline phenomena, they are a space-time of con/fusion, bodily co-existence (coincidence) of identities which it links in a vital and deadly relation, at the same time preparing their separation and distinction. Space-time which both confuses and produces one and another identity, questioning that subject/object demarcation on which the delusive stability of the self is founded. Forever threatened by the frailty of a boundary built on the originary void of loss and on the impossible refusal of corporeality, the subject experiences in the feeling of abjection the uncertainty of its identity; the risk - fear and desire - of falling back into that space-time where it grew, which it left in order to be. **Rejected, repressed, expelled, yet inevitably present and forever to be kept at bay, the abject physically inhabits those areas of the body which will become erotogenic zones, in that tension and coincidence between attraction and revulsion which also - especially - marks the female/maternal body**. Borderline, marginal areas; and, Mary Douglas reminds us, "all margins are dangerous. [So that] we should expect the orifices of the body to symbolyse its especially vulnerable points". Eyes, mouth, nose, anus, genitals. And their secretions, which "by simply issuing forth have traversed the boundary of the body" (Douglas 1966: 121). Tears, saliva, vomit, mucus, faeces, urina, sperm, menstrual blood.       As though in "horrendous excremental drains" (Camporesi, 1991: 12), in counter-Reformation Catholic culture these bodily secretions characterize the post-Tridentine hell, obscene site of a promiscuous and chaotic carnality; a vision which lasts until the 19th century, as Pietro Camporesi shows in *The Fear of Hell. Images of Damnation and Salvation in Early Modern Europe*, where he explores and analyzes the figurations of hell in art and literature. Thus, in the "oafish underworld" of Belli's sonnets - he argues - this vision becomes "almost a Tartarean version of birth *ex-putri*" (Camporesi 1991: 12, 13), where   the phantasma of the great collective body of humanity, the archaic belief in a fertile death, a pregnant death, the nursemaid of new life, the sense of continuity in death-life re-emerged. The hidden shadow of the one belonging to the many reappeared, as did the sense of a fatal, cyclical rotation, an uninterrupted pendulum between life and death, between decomposition and rebirth (Camporesi 1991: 13-14).   Continuity is not a reason for hope, in the awareness of belonging to the cycle of being; on the contrary, it engenders horror for the corrupting, destructive confusion of the self, a condition of imperfect and improper not-being-anymore. Imperfect and improper like the not-yet-being of the pre-natal period, spent in the closed, red, pulsating space of the mother's womb: suffocation and protection, dreaded hell and longed for Nirvana which in this longing is inhabited by the death drive. The womb is a liminal space, which must necessarily be crossed to come into the world; as in a rite of passage, this limen is ambiguously connoted, it is not-life and not-death.       Analysing the liminal phase of rites of passage, Victor Turner remarks that its symbolism draws upon both "the biology of death, decomposition, catabolism" and "processes of gestation and parturition" (Turner 1967: 96); thus the same symbols - huts and tunnels, for instance - signify both the maternal womb and the tomb. While stressing the positive value attributed by Turner to the transitional liminal phase as a field of open potentialities, Paola Cabibbo underlines this “coincidence of opposing processes and notions [which] characterizes the peculiar unity of liminality; it is neither this nor that, and yet it is both this and that” (Cabibbo 1993: 13). Or, to use Turner's own words again, the subjects of  a rite of passage "are neither living nor dead from one aspect, and both living and dead from another. Their condition is one of ambiguity and paradox, a confusion of all the customary categories" (Turner 1967: 97).       Ambiguity, confusion: abjection.       But in a socially and culturally created rite of passage there is no return to the limen between the before and after of initiation, once the subject has been re-defined and re-demarcated in a new social and subjective space. Abjection, on the contrary, is the recurring, threatening sensation of an incurable instability of the self, it is the radical and repeated questioning of the integrity of the subject. It finds expression in the body, in the secretions which crossing its boundaries exceed it, in its hollows, crevices, orifices. Sites of expulsion and - for example in the case of food - of incorporation; borderline sites of horror and pleasure, of abjection. Kristeva writes:   We may call it a border: abjection is above all ambiguity. Because, while releasing a hold, it does not radically cut off the subject from what threatens it - on the contrary, abjection acknowledges it to be in perpetual danger. But also, abjection itself is a compromise of judgment and affect, of condemnation and yearning, of signs and drives. Abjection preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-objectal relationship, in the immemorial violence with which the body becomes separated from another body in order to be - maintaining that night in which the outline of the signified vanishes and where only the imponderable affect is carried out (Kristeva 1982: 9-10).   And she goes on to argue that  the abject is the violence of mourning for an 'object' that has always already been lost. [...] It takes the ego back to its source on the abominable limits from which, in order to be, the ego has broken away - it assigns it a source in the non-ego, drive, and death (Kristeva 1982: 15).  In the fear and desire of being overwhelmed by that lost body is a form of the feeling of abjection, which in many cultures is expressed and contained through rituals of purification. Rituals: because the abject borders upon - coincides with, says Kristeva - the sacred. With the interdictions against the danger of its contamination, the abject lays at the roots of the sacred. "As abjection - so the sacred"(Kristeva 1982: 19) is the title of a passage where she briefly looks at the modes of purification in religion, from so called primitive religions to Jewish monotheism to Christianity: exclusion and taboo, transgression, sin - then to suggest that in our culture the abject finds expression and containment in writing. "Outside of the sacred, the abject is written" - she maintains, talking of “the aesthetic task - a descent into the foundations of the symbolic construct - [which] amounts to retracing the fragile limits of the speaking being, closest to its dawn, to the bottomless 'primacy' constituted by primal repression” (Kristeva 1982: 18).       Literature can thus be seen as an exploration of the abject; metaphorization of lack and fear so that the self can come to life again in signs (see Kristeva 1982: 38). In a century marked by the process of secularization, but also traversed by a renewed need of the sacred, writing becomes "a cache for suffering"; in the unbearable instability of the boundary between subject and object, "the narrative is what is challenged first"; its linearity is shattered up to the scream of a language which resembles violence and obscenity. The descents into hell of Céline's and Lispector's writing are the collapsing of narration into that *crying-out theme* which, coinciding "with the incandescent states of a boundary-subjectivity [...] called abjection", is according to Kristeva "the *crying-out theme* of suffering-horror" (Kristeva 1982: 140-41).       In  the journey towards the origins, where life and death meet, where the danger and pleasure of the loss of self are intertwined, in literature as well the feeling of abjection often becomes embodied in the female/maternal body. Already signified in religions and myths, revisited by psychoanalysis, the mother and the maternal are the privileged figure of the inextricable proximity of life and death at the centre of the symbolic construction.